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ABSTRACT
ExpectedInterruptions in Labor Force Participation and
Sex Related Differences in Earnings Growth
The paper analyzes the joint determination of wives' earnings and
labor force participation over the life cycle given the interruptions in
wives' work careers. The interruptions affect the profitability of the
investment in human capital, which in turn determines earnings. The earnings
prospects feed back into the participation decision, namely, the decision
whether and for how long to drop out of the labor force.
The formal analysis compares the age—earnings profiles of persons
who drop Out of the labor force with those who do not during the pre— and
post—interruptionperiod. The comparison is carried out where interruptions
are assumed to be exogenous and when they are endogenou The effect of
productivityat home, the initial stock of human capital and its rental










The last decade has witnessed an awakened interest in the role of
women in the labor market, Spurred by the increasing share of women in the
labor force, economists have focused on the factors that affect women's (and n
particular, married women's) labor supply and their compensation (particularly
their pay relative to males). Though it has long been recognized that wages
arid participation are jointly determined, most empirical studies of labor force
participation tend to regard wages as an exogenous variable, while studies of
the structure of women's wages (and male-female wage differentials) often regard
labor force experience (namely, participation in the past) as exogenous.
In this paper we examine the mplications of the interaction between participation
and wages for the interpretation of observed, sex related, differences in earn:ngs
The link binding participation and wages is the individual investment
In himself Investment in human capital on the job is one of the ways for an
individual to increase his future wages. Labor force participation is a pre-
requisite for this kind of investment. Thus participation affects future wages
which in turn affect future participaton. Conversely future participation pars
determine the utilization of human capital and therefore influences current
investment decisions.
The feature that makes the women's experience so unique and different tom
that of males' is the interruptions (or expected interruptions) in thel .careers
associated with marriage, birth of chi idren and geographical mobility The
interruptions do not merely result in the loss of current earnings; they also—2-
affect investment in human capital. Consequently, the difference between
the earning of women and men reflects both the loss of human capital due to
past interruptions and the lower accumulation of human capital due to expected
future interruptions. An understanding of these complex interactions between
wages and partcpation at different stages of the life cycle is crucial for
the interpretation of recent findings on sex related differences in earnings
growth and on wage discrimination,
1n often-noted empirical regularity is the tendency of the sex-related
earnings differentials to increase with potential work experience for at least
the early phases of the work cycle. While the phenomenon has been observed in
both cross—section arid longitudinal data (see Johnson and Stafford [1974],
Farber [1977], Weiss and Lillard [1978]), a different explanation applies in
each case In cross—section data, as potential experience increases so does the
like thood of past breaks in experience.It is then sufficient to assume that the
accumulation of human capital i inhibited by exits from the labor force. In
longitudinal data where individuals are observed repeatedly, or alternatively
when retospective data on past exits from the labor force is avai lable, one can
control for such differences in work history. The explanation In this case must
rely on the unobservable future breaks in labor-force participation.It has been
argued (see Mincer and Polachek [1974]) that a woman who expects a shorter work spar
will invest less in activities that raise her earning capacity.In contrast to
the previous explanation, which relies on properties common to all wealth—maximizing
models of human capital, the second explanation requires assumptions on the specific
form of the production function, The reason is that the slope of the optimal earning-3-
profile depends not only on the rate of investment but also on the speed at
which investment is reduced. An explanation that merely states that women are
likely to invest less in on the job training is incomplete, unless it is also
shown that women do not reduce their investment faster than men. A question arises.
what are the restrictions on the production function which would enable us to
infer the effects of future breaks on earnings growth?
Several authors (e.g. Johnson-Stafford [1974], Oxaca [1977] have attempted
to measure the discrimination that women face in the labor market. Attention has
been given to wage discrimination (as distinct from barriers to entry) whereby
the market awards women with lower returns for "identical" characteristics.
Presumably such a phenomenon would be revealed by differences in the level of
earnings standardizing for differences in schooling and work experience. However,
such comparisons fail to account for the unobserved differences in participation
plans. Thus, for the same experience, women may have lower earnings because they
invested less in the past, expecting to participate less in the future. One
would not ascribe this gap in earnings to discrimination, unless the expected
interruptions are caused by discrimination. Two questions arise: can one separate
the effects of past and future breaks? How much of the observed difference in the
level of earnings can be ascribed to discrimination?
The objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the
analysis of the above issues. A modified version of the model in Blinder and
Weiss [1976] is presented in which labor force participation and earnings are
jointly determined over the life cycle. In previous works, either wages or
participation were taken as exogenous (e.g. Heckman Macurdy [1980], Polachek [1975]
Our analysis is also limited, however, in treating fertility and marriage decisions
as exogenous andinignoring variations in the intensity of labor force participation-4-
To simplify the exposition, we first assume that labor forceinterruptions
are exogenously determined and fully anticipated. Breaking the link between
earnings and participation, we are free to analyze the effect of career
interruptions on the earnings structure. Two features of the earnings profiles
are examined: the level of earnings and their rate of growth. To separate these
issues, we restrict the analysis to models in which either the absolute growth or
its rate are independent of the stock of capital. The age-earnings profiles of
people who drop out of the labor force are compared with those who do not during
the pre- and post-interruption periods. It is often asserted that women havea
flatter earnings profile because of their lower rate of investment in human
capital. We point out that to make this assertion one has to know not only the
level of investment but also its rate of change over time. It is shown that under
our assumptions on the nature of the investment production function, an expected
interruptions in labor force participation will lead to a reduction in earnings
growth if and only if the earning-experience profiles are concave.
The second part of the paper relaxes the assumption that labor force
interruptions are exogenous. The labor force participation decision depends on
current wages, the prospects of further investment in human capital, and productivity
in the home sector. We begin by noting that planned temporary (as opposed to
permanent) withdrawals are not consistent with fixed market conditions and fixed
productivity at home. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce some time or age
dependence into the model. We introduce explicit dependence of productivity at
home on age. It is assumed that increases in home productivity occur injumps
associated with the birth of children, with productivity declining as the children—s.
growolder. It is shown that a necessary condition for women who have left
the labor force to return co work is that the rate of decline of home producti
exceeds the rate cf depreciation ofhumancapital. The probability and the
duration ofwtthdravai aregreater the higher is the productivity at home and
the lower s the initial stock of human capital and its rental value, As noted
by Strober andQuester andJohnson and Stafford [1977] discrimination
againstwomen in the lahot force is a possible cause for their longer withdrawals
Thus, wage iscr:mnacien criaffectnot only the levelof earnings hut also the
patternsof lfl\eSTmefltand earninggowrh through its effect onthe length of
career interrupt Ions
The last seetton of the paper draws the implications of our analysis for
the interpretaUori of sex related differences inearnings.2.AMODELOF EARNINGSAND LAJ3ORFORCE PARTICiPATION
2a.Desciion of the Maximlratron Problem
Con dci an ndiv.dual who plans a life time earnings and participation
program under conditions of certainty and perfect capital markets. At each
ponr n tinie t1e endsvidual may either participate in the labor force or not.
t he the index of labor force participation such that P(t I
yhr :ncL vlduai s LO the labor force. or in chool and P(t)0 otheise,
harnngs capac ry rnthelabor market depends on pt participation and investment
1-:t ternsActuai earnings depend on current earning capacity and
hK(rbe. the earnings capacity of the individual where K is the
ctock ofhumancap.taland R ts rental value. Let yt,, 0y(t)1, be
theprop :'rt on ofearnings potentiai that isrealized in the form of actual
ernng.thus, f the individual participates, his observed earnirLg, Y, equals
8> grv.ng ip pat of lu current earning capacity, the idual improves
his furire eanrngs' potenraiaccording to the production function:!
Pf,K -•K ,£0, K0
where denotes the deprecration rate of human capital.
ftc vaiue of time during periods of nonparticipation is denoted byQt.
Productivityat home is assumedexogenous, that is, independent of the
participation and investment history of the individual. It may depend, however,
onage, number and age of chi idren, health and similar factors, and may V ary,
therefore ocr the life cycle.—7—





sOt, (1) and K(0) =
K0
where Fis theplanning horizon and r the market rate of interest.
the necessary conditions which the optimal program must satisfy are:





'0 1ff P =1
iffP=0
(5) =(r+ (T)0
where the function (t) is the shadow price of human capital divided by
Condition (3) determines the optimal value allocation ofearning potential
betweencurrent earnings andinvestment,If the individual participates, P =1,
then an interior maximum requires that the opportunity costs of y in terms of
current earnings (represented by K) equals the value of marginal product in
terms of future earning potential (represented by iPf)Ifthe individual does-8-
not participate(P =0)y is indeterminant, Participation need not imply
positive earnings, since the individual may specialize in "schooling'
(y =0)
Theparticipation decision described in condition (4) involves the comparison
of home productivity with the full value of market oriented activitiesconsisting
of realized earnings and the value of investment. Onemay participate even if the
current wage is below the productivity at home provided that theimputed value of
the increase in future earnings capacity issufficiently high. The participation
decision is a function of past work history (embodied inK) and future work
plans(reflected in ).
Condition(5) describes the development of the marginal value of human
capital along the optimal path. When the individual is out of the labor force
(P =0),the shadow price of human capital is increasing (see alsoPolachek [1975]),
This reflects the profitability of shifting investment from thetime just prior to
the exit to the time just after entry, thus saving thedepreciation and interest
costs associated with unutilized human capital.
We describe the solution to conditions (3) to (5) in twostages. In
subsection 2b, we consider the case in which labor force participation isexogenously
determined and condition (4) is therefore not binding. The problem is then reduced
to the analysis of the effects of past and anticipated exogenous interruptions in
labor force participation on the development of earnings over the life cycle. We
consider separately in sub-section 2c the case in which labor forceparticipation
is endogenous.2b. Exogenous Breaks in Labor Force Participation
We wish to compare the optimal earnings profiles of two (otherwise identical)
individuals: A, who participates continuously (P(t) =1forall ta[O,T]);
and B who expects a single interruption in labor-force participation such
that P(t) =0forta [t', t"] andP(t) =1forta [0,t')and
t a(t",T].The difference in the earnings profiles of the two individuals
prior to t' can be ascribed to differences in their anticipations while the
difference after t" can be ascribed to differences in theirhistory. The
historyof the system is captured by the accumulated amount of human capital K,
while anticipations for the future are summarized in the shadow price
In general, K and tJaffect both the level and growth of earnings, and it
is difficult to separate the roles of past (potentially observed) and future
(unobservable) interruptions in labor force participation. There is, however,
a special class of models in which expected interruptions are revealed by the
choices of the individuals with respect to their earnings growth. That is, the
slope of the earning profile is independent of the levelof human capital. There
are two such specifications:
(6) f(K,y) =g[K(1-y)] ,g'0, g" cQg(0) =0
and
(7) f(K,y) =Kh(y) ,h'<0,h"0, h(l) =0
Theform (6) imposes Ben-Porath's [1967] "neutrality" hypothesis. In this
case the slope of the earning profile, i.e., the absolute growth in earning,
is, in the absence of depreciation, independent of K. The form (7), due to
Blinder and Weiss [1976], leads to the independence from K of the slope of
3/
thelog earning profile (i.e. the rate of growth in earnings),—- 10-
Considerthe formulation (6) first: The optimal path is characterized
by the following conditions:
(3') P[1 —bg'(K(l—y))] 0 if 0 <y 1
1r 6] -P if0y 1
O-Pg'(K)] if yr0
=0
For ihespecification(61 one can show that during periods of participation,
is ever positive itremains positive thereafter.!' Since during periods
fnonparticipation, P =0, is increasing,it follows that during periods
of participation, P =1, must decrease monotonical1y Otherwise the condition
U i.1i be .o1ated, If we denote the shadow price for the two indcviduals
by 1it)andBt) respectively, then it follows from (3') and(5') that
person A and person B face the same shadow price of human capital after the
Lnterrton()I)A(tj =Bt)for t(t", T]), but person A has a higher
shadowprice prior to the interruption (A(t)B(t)for t c
The slope of the earning profile during periods with positive earnings can
he written as:
Yr g'+g-6K if 0y1,p1
=- ify =1, P=1— 11—
Itis seen from (8) and (3') that if 6 =0,the slope depends only on
In this case, individuals A and B will have the same slope for their earnings
profile (i.e, the same absolute growth in earnings) during the interval (t", T].
in the period preceding t', the slope of B's profile will be lower if and
only if the (absolute) curvature index L1_ is decreasing with the rate of
investment. This is seen from:
(9) [(gtt) gtgtj( -1) when 6 =0,0y <i,p =1.
The concavity of the earning-experience profiles during the period of on-the-
• dY
job investment requires that >0.Thus a specification of the production function
thatyields a strictly concave earning-experience profile also implies a lower
earnings growth for B prior to the withdrawal from the labor force at time t'
(specifically, this is true ifone adopts the commonly used homogeneity assumption,
namely,that g( )hasa constant elasticity). A border-line case in which the
slope of both earnings profiles is the same is when g( )isexponential, i.e.
=a-
-
VThentherate of depreciation is positive, the slope of the earning profile
depends also on the level of human capital, and therefore on initial conditions.
Since B has a lower rate of investment prior to t', he will have a lower level
of K, and thus a higher slope for his earning profile during the interval (t",T].
During the period prior to t', the lower accumulation and the shorter horizon
may have opposing effects on the slope of the earning profile and the outcome
appears ambiguous.
In empirical comparisons of men's and women's earnings, it is common to
compare the logs of earning profiles, that is,to focus on earnings growth rates.— 12—
However,under specification (6) the effect of an expected interruption on the
rateof growth in earning is unclear, since both Y and Y are likely to be
lower during the phase preceding t'. Let us turn, therefore, to specification
(7) which places direct restrictions on the growth rate of earnings. The
optimal path is now characterized by the conditions:
(3's) P[l +Ph'(y)]=0 if 0 <y<1
(5'') (T) =0and i= (r÷-P[y+iph(y)]
As in the previous case, is increasing when P =0and decreasing
elsewhere.' Also =8(t)for t(t",T] andA(t)
>iP(t)for
t c [0,t").
A convenient property of the specification (7) is that during periods
of positive earnings is determined uniquely by iaccordingto the relation:
(10) .=-1--[-(r+6)
+y(Eh+Eh,




(11) Eh =-h'(y)y>0andEh, = > 0
Thus, for the interval (t",T] both individuals will have the same
slope for their log earning profile. In the period prior to t', B will have a- 13-
lowerearnings growth if and only if the (relative) curvature index is
increasing with y. This follows from:





((r +rS) _h(Eh+l))-Eh,. If 0 <y<1,p =1
h'
Again,we note that if a specification is chosen such that log earning experience
profiles are concave during the periodof positive on-the-job investment
(0<y<1)then the effect of expected interruption is to reduce earnings growth.
A border-line case in which the slope of both log earning profiles will be the same
iswhen h'(y) is of constant elasticity, i.e., h(y) =(l-
Sofar, we have discussed only one aspect of the optimal lifetime earnings
profiles, namely their slope. The implications for earnings growth must, however,
be tested jointly withthe implications concerning the level ofearnings and
the period of schooling. Under both specifications (6) and (7),thelevel
of earnings must be lower for individual B during the interval (t",T]. This
results from the fact that during this phase, the investment rates of A and B
are identical, while B's stock of human capital is lower. During the phase
prior to t' the level of B's earnings may exceed A's for a while since B
invests a smaller proportion of his lower earning capacity. Both models predict
a shorter period of specialization (in which y =0and therefore Y =0)for
• • 6/ individual B.—
Finally,wage discrimination does not affect the investment in human capital
and earning growth as long as the length of the interruption in the womants work
career is exogenously given. Discrimination, in our case, affects the cost of
investment and the return to the same extent. It lowers the level of earnings but
does not affect earning growth.- 14-
2c.Endogenous Withdrawals from the Labor Force
The pattern of exits and entries into the labor force depends on the
development over time of productivity at home and in the market. We wish to
present some restrictions on Q(t) which will limit the number of exits and
entries and determine their pattern. In this analysis we shall restrict ourselves
to the specification (7). We utilize some special properties of the optimal
solution which hold under specification (7). These are described in the following
two lemmas.




Proof. Differentiation of V with respect to time yields:
(14) V= R{[y+h(y)]K+K[1+h'(y)]y+Kh(y)}
Using conditions (3tt)and(5") we obtain:
(15) V=-6V+(r÷)RKh(y)= rV -RKy(r+ó)- 15—
Lemma2:Let E(t,K(t)) denote the present value (evaluated at t) of
earnings associated with the optimal program. Then,
(16) E=
ThatIs ,which,by definition, is the marginal value of K (divided by R)
also equals the average value (divided by R). (See also Blinder Weiss[1976,p.456]).
Proof, Using (5') we find that:
(17) (ipK) =+ iK=r'K-PKy
Multiplying both sides of (17) by Re(Tt), and integrating from
t to T,using (T) =0,we obtain:
(18) RK =j e_Tt)RPKydT
Let Q(t) be differentiable. We can then prove the following
propositions:
Proposition1: At a point of entry into the labor force, productivity at
home must increase at a rate which is less than the market interest rate,
Proof. At a point of entry we must have Q= VandQ< V.Therefore
<<r.- 16 -
Proposition2:At a point of exit from the labor force, productivity at
home cannot decrease at a rate which exceeds the depreciation rate of human
capital, .>-S.
Proof. At a point of exit we have Q =VandQ>V.Therefore >.>-S.
Proposition 3: If a point of exit is followed by a point of entry, then at the
point of re-entry, productivity at home must decline at a rate which exceeds
the depreciation of human capital.
Proof. Let there be an exit at time to followed by re-entry at t1.









,K(t)is takenasgiven andall other possible
switching points remain constant.
Thefirst and second order derivatives of W(t1) are:
-r(t1 -t0)
(20) Wt(t1) =e [Q(t1) -\T(t1)J
-r(t1-t )
(21) W"(t1)
=-rW'(t1) + e [Q(t1)
+5V(t1) -
RK(t1)h(y)(t1)J
Aninterior solution for t1 requires W'(t1) =0and W"(t1) < 0. Since
< 0 it is necessary that Q+óV(t1) =Q+SQ(t1) < 0.- 17-
Noticethat the Pontryagin necessary conditions (3) to (5) imply only
W'(t1) =0.The second order condition w"(t1) <0is an additional
requirement for optimality which becomes relevant ifthesolution to (3)to(5)is
notunique. Indeed, due to the multiplicative appearance of K, P and y,
the maximand in (2) need not beconcave. In orderto gain further insight into
thenature of this difficulty, assume that Q(t) is a constant and consider
the phase diagram in Figure 1.Suppose that there is a solution to conditions (3)
to(5) such that P =0for t £[0,t1) and P =1for t e [t1.,T]. This
solution is presented in the phase diagram by trajectory II. Existence of such a
solution implies that there are at least two other solutions, one with P =1
fort c [0,T]and anotherwith P =0for t[O,T] which also satisfy the
necessaryconditions (3)to (5).Theseare presented in Figure 1 by the
trajectoriesI andIIIrespectively. Lemma 2allows us to compare the value of
theobjective function associated with each of the three programs. From (21)
wesee that Q(t) =0implies that W"(t1) >Ufor all t1 in whichW' (t1) =0.
-l - . y=O,P=l














Thuseither of the "corner" solutions t1 =0or t1 =Tis superior to a
plan with re-entry at 0 <t1
<T.
An important corollary of our analysis is that constant productivity
at home cannot generate the exit and re-entry patterns of married women.
When Q(t)isa constant independent of age, workers will choose either to
workthroughout their life (with a possible final "retirement't phase) or not
toparticipate at all. The choice between these alternatives depends on the
relative magnitudes of Q and RK0 and on the potential gains from
investment in human capital.
It seems likely that productivity of men at home is relatively low and
independent of age; their optimal plan is therefore to participate continuously
in the labor force. For a married woman (or one who expects to marry) it is
more plausible to assume that Q increases at early ages when family size
increases and decreases at later ages as children grow up. Moreover, Q(t)
may have jumps at points at which birth occur. There is thus a potential for
planned exits and entries into the labor force. Let us assume, for simplicity
that productivity at home has a single jump, at t =to,and depreciates at
a constant rate thereafter. That is
10 for0<t<t — 0
(22) Q(t) =
—p(t—t)ofor t0<t<T
Ifwe further assume that p >5,then, due to Proposition 2, an exit
from the labor force may occur only at the point of discontinuity to,- 19-
and,due to Proposition 3, an interior solution with re-entry at some point
to <t1
<Tmay be optimal. There will be at most, one episode of a planned
departurefrom the labor force. The remainder of this section is devoted to
the analysis of this expected departure.
p (t-t0)
DefiningZ(t)=K(t)e we can use a phase diagram similar to the
oneused before to describe the solutions for equations (3)to (5) during the
phase [t01T]. For any given departure of length t1 -toone can use
(3") and (5") to determine the shadow price of human capital (t) at the
point of re-entry t1 and thepoint of exit t0. Given the demand price of
humancapital at to, one can solve for the optimal accumulation from
time 0 to t0, K(t) and the stock of human capital at the point of re-entry




=K(t)e The liness in Figure 2 describes the
level of human capital that will be supplied at to for any given shadow price
P (t0). Its positive slope reflects the fact that, due to (3") the rate
of accumulation of human capital is increasing in .Thepairs Z (t1), t1)
associated with different prespecified values of re-entry time, t1, are repres-
ented in Figure 2 by the curve aa. For any prespecified value
t1 the optimal trajectory satisfying (3")and (5")
must start on ssat time t, and crossaa at time t1.
The trajectory corresponding to the optimal value of t1 satisfying conditions
(3"), (5") and (4) must pass through the intersection of aa with Q= V















aahas a smaller slope (in absolute value) at the point of intersection
than the locus Q =V.This assumption guarantees that an interior solution
represented in Figure 2 by the trajectory II is the only one satisfying the
necessary conditions and is truly optimal.-7'
Consider now the effect of an increase in Q. This will shift the locus
V =Qto the right. The new intersection with aa will be at a lower level
of 1(t1),implying an increase int1 and the duration of the departure from
the labor force.-" If the increase in Q is sufficiently large, aa and the
locus V =Qdo not intersect, i.e., no re-entry occurs. Similarly, an increase
in the initial stock of human capitalK0 shifts the ss and aa curves
to the right. Since the intersection of aa with the VQ locus will be
at a higher level of(t1), t1 must be reduced.(If aa intersects ss
above the point where the locus V =Qcuts ss, the person will not withdraw
altogether.) Thus, women with a higher initial stock of human capital will
plan shorter withdrawals from the labor force. Their earning profiles prior to
the withdrawal will be steeper.
We have seen that when labor force interruptions are exogenous,wage
discrimination had no effect on earning growth. This is no more true when
the length of the interruption is a decision variable. The effect of a reduction
in the rental rate for human capital, R, is identical in the
present model to that of an increase in Q. Wage discrimination results in
flatter earnings profiles because it increases the length of career interruptions.- 21-
3.IMPLICATIONS FOR SEX RELATED EARNINGS DIFFERENCES
The discussion in this paper highlights the strong interdependency between
lifetime plans of labor-force participation, the level of earnings, and earnings
growth. Differences in the level of earnings reflect both past and future
participation plans. We identified, however, models in which differences in
earningsgrowth reflect differences in participation plans. Observing two groups
with similar growth rate we may conclude that future plans andthuscurrent
investmentpatterns are similar. We can thenascribe differencesin wage levels
to differences in earning capacity. Differences in earning capacity not explained
by differences in experience or schooling may be ascribedto discrimination
providedthat past departures from the labor force are viewed as exogenous.
If withdrawals from the labor force are partially endogenous, standardization
for differences in work history will underestimate the full effect of discrimination
on earnings differences.Findings by Farber [1977] suggest that the
male-femaledifference in earnings growth ismore pronounced at early ages and
tendsto vanish later. Thus the natural period in the life cycle for sex related
comparisonsinearnings is rather late, e.g. the 40-50 age group, contrary to the
proceduresuggested by Johnson and Stafford [1974] who compare initial
salaries.
If women expect longer breaks in their work career, thei.r reduced investment
in human capital should not be confined exclusively to investments on the job.
Schooling will also be reduced. If one admits the possibility that the
interruptions may be due to discrimination, a standardization for schooling in
comparing male-female earnings differences yields an underestimate of the full- 22-
impact.One may also question the legitimacy of the comparison of earnings
of women and men with the same level of schooling on the grounds of selectivity
bias. Expecting an interrupted work career, women will invest in schooling as
much as men, only if they are more efficient investors.2'
Expected withdrawals from the labor force, whether caused by discrimination
or 'objectivet factors, discourage investments in increased earning potential.
Investment, however, is not directly observable and the question is; What are
the empirical manifestations of the reduction in investment? It is not true
that earnings growth is uniformly lower for individuals who choose to invest less.
However, for the special case of separable production functions where earnings growth
dependsonly on the level of investment, one obtains an a priori consistency
test:any two measured characteristics that can be assumed to have the same
effect on investment will havesimilar effect on earnings growth. Thus, if
earnings growth declines with experience, women will have lower growth in earnings
than men. This conclusion is consistent with evidence from panel data that the
earnings growth rates decrease with experience and are lower for women after
adjustment is made for past breaks in experience (see Mincer and Polachek [1974],
Weiss and Lillard [1978], Gustafson [1980]), and that women who reported
expectations for labor force participation have higher growth in earnings
(Sandell and Shapiro [1980]).
The introduction of endogenous departures from the labor force enriches
the models of wage growthconsiderably. The separation betweenfactors that
affect the level and growth in earnings, introduced by the simplifying
specification of the production function, disappears. In particular, differences
intherental rate and in the initial stock of human capital affect schooling- 23-
andearnings growth. Discrimination reflected in a lower rental rate for women
induces longer planned withdrawals from the labor force. Thus discrimination
reveals itself not only in the wage level which women may receive for the same
work experience and the same education but, to some extent, in their lower
wage growth as well. Findings by Mincer and Ofek [1980] indicate that higher
schooling levels are associated with shorter durations of the interruption i.n
labor force participation. Such a relation contributes to a positive interactIon
between education and earnings growth. One would, therefore, expect the schooling
experience interaction to be stronger among women than among men with similar
work history. Our preliminary tests using Israeli data fail to support this
hypothesis
The labor force participation model that emerges from our analysis is quite
different from the simple view of women as marginal workers moving in and out
of the labor force as new wage opportunities arise. Instead, the woman is viewed
as choosing between two occupations; work at home and work in the market. The
accumulation of human capital, or learning—by-doing in the market sector, is a
strong deterrent to occupational mobility (see Weiss [1971]). Even if one extends
our model to allow unexpected events, specialization is quite likely. It has been
recently argued (Heckman Willis [1977]) that post marital labor force experience
of women has a J shaped distribution, a large fraction of women working only a
very small part of their time after marriage and a large fraction working through
most of their lifetime. Our model provides a rationale for this presumed
heterogeneity in behavior. By this explanation, even a symmetric distribution
of characteristics such as the initial stock of human capital, K0, and home
productivity, Q,maygenerate a J shaped distribution of post marital (or- 24-
moreaccurately, post birth) labor force participation. A certain fraction
of women will never drop out of the labor force since at the time of birth
their full value of market activities exceeds their home productivity.
The distribution of the other women by the duration of their withdrawal from the
labor force depends on the parameters
RK0, r, S, pandto. Because
of the finite lifetime we may observe a bunching at the other extreme end of
the distribution due to truncation (i.e., women who are expected to reenter
the labor force at a point t1 >Tnever return).- 25-
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1. Strictly speaking (1) is a description of the equilibrium wage structure
rather than of production technology (see Rosen [19721).
2. This assumption ignores accumulation of capital in home activities and
transferability of capital across activities (see Weiss [1971)). The
assumption that human capital acquired at the market has only limited
use at home is quite plausible for on—the-job training and for high
levels of schooling (e.g. Ph.D Degree). Empirical findings of a positive
effectof schooling on labor force participation suggest a bias in
schoolings towards market activities.
3.A more realistic formulation of the Blinder and Weiss function is
(7') f(K,y)=KMax[h(y), a(1-yfl
Thetwo branches of (7') correspondto investment-on-the-job and in school
respectively.We may assume that schooling is the more efficient way of
acquiring high levels of growth, i.e. h(o) <a,and that on-the-job
investment is more efficient for low levels of investment, i.e.
h' (1) >-a.The linearity of the schooling activity reflects the
feasibility of mixing schooling with work. This formulation can capture
the discontinuity in investment which appears to occur at the end of the
schooling period (see Mincer [1974], p.94). Upon entry into the labor




4. For intervals in which =(r+ - 1,if )isever positive then
is positive and increasing thereafter, This contradicts ip(T) =0.Hence,
in particular, (r +6)ij 1at the point of exit from the phase in which
y =0.Therefore (r +6)<gt(K*)where K* is the amount of capital
accumulated up to this point, Since g"( )< 0,it follows that
(r +6)<g'(K)for all K0K K*,
5.We assume h(0) >r+6.For y =0and P =1it follows immediately that
=tp[r+6-h(0)]<0.For 0 'y<1and P =1we have
=[r+6-h(y) +yh'(y)],since [(-h(y) +yh'(y))=yh"(y)<0,
h(y) -yh'(y)>h(0)and i< 0.For yi p =1 =(r+6)p-land
must be negative or else the transverslity condition iP(T) =0will be
violated. A similar argument holds for specification (7') in footnote 3,
except that we assume a >r+6and use the fact that h(l +
Eh)
=aat y0.
6.Under specification (6) the period of specification is determined by the
condition g'K) =(t).Since
g'(K)is increasing with age throughout the
interval y =0(this can be shown to hold even if 6 >0)and since
B(t) and A(t) are both decreasing while B(t) <A(tthe specialization
phase will end earlier for B. Similarly under specification (7) a switch
occurs when 1P(t) =-
h'(o)'again since B(t) and iI)A(t) are decreasing,
< and -
h'(o)
is a constant, B will start to have positive
earnings at an earlier age. The same is true if we use specification (7')
in footnote 3 except that there will be a jump from 0 toy0 when
(t) =- ___- 27-
7. Takingthe derivative of (19), allowing k(t0) to vary, we
obtainthe following second order condition:
amK(t)
(21') Q(t )+'SV(t)- RK(t)h(y) i(t)-V(t) °< 0
1 1 o o 1
at1











Comparing the two slopes it is seen that (21') implies that the slope
of aa is smaller in absolute values.- 28
8.A direct proof canbederived from the following inequalities:
(23) :°etRKydt+ QePt +IetRKydt>:°
etRKydt+
+ etdt +fetRKydt







* * * whereQ >Qand Ky is evaluated along the path optimal for Q and Ky
is evaluated along the path optimal for Q. These inequalities hold because
the accumulation path Ky is feasible also at the 'price' Q and viceversa,
Subtracting (24) from (23) and rearranging yields:
(25) - (P-r)t>o implying,implying t >t1.
9.It is the relative efficiency of investment in school andonthe job
which is relevant for the determination of the schooling period. Women
mayinvest as much in schooling as malesdespite their shorter horizon
because they find that they cannot invest on the job at the same terms
of trade as males.- 29-
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